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Abstract 
This paper analyzes income convergence within EU-15 over the period 1995 to 2013. By means of panel data techniques, we 
examine conditional β-convergence controlling for the impact of some economic factors such as investment in physical and 
human capital, inflation, government consumption and openness. In addition, the role of two institutional variables, corruption 
and bureaucracy is examined. We found that corruption, affects negatively the growth, in the full sample. On the contrary 
bureaucracy, hasn’t any significant effect on the growth performance of the wealthier EU members, while affects rather 
differently the economic performance of the four cohesion countries, namely Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, hampering 
growth.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite the considerable research that has been conducted in the field, convergence keeps on being a hot issue. 
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Unlike most previous studies analyze growth determinants over long periods of time relying on cross-section data, a 
new round of empirical papers used pooled data at relatively short frequencies, along with either panel techniques or 
differenced specifications, to control for unobserved country heterogeneity. However, as the theoretical channels 
through which growth determinants affect growth are different, determinants are often found to be insignificant or 
have the "wrong" sign in growth regressions producing contradictive conclusions. Furthermore, the effects of 
corruption and bureaucracy on growth have been also a topic of debate at a theoretical as well as at an empirical 
level.  
The rise of cross-country income disparities over time in the EU-15 and, more specifically the differences in 
growth experience of the cohesion countries are possibly originated from differences in socioeconomic, 
demographic or structural characteristics. Greece and Ireland together with Portugal and Spain form the group of 
“cohesion” countries within the EU. That definition was established after the enlargement of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) to Southern Europe, in 1981 and 1986. It was born out of the consideration that the 
integration into the Communities of the peripheral countries would imply measures to take into account differentials 
in development levels. In terms of GDP per head, all four are below 75% of the EEC average and they are classified, 
for purposes of Structural Fund aid, as lagging behind the rest of the Community in terms of development and as 
such qualify for higher rates of aid. Finally, all four are situated on the periphery of the Community, while two of 
them, Ireland and Greece, are geographically remote from the rest of the Community.  
In this context, it would be interesting to investigate whether the fifteen older members of the EU share common 
growth paths, examining particularly the role of corruption and bureaucracy in the convergence process. Another 
motive has been the relative limited empirical evidence on this topic in the context of panel analysis, accounting for 
institutional variables. Additionally, the expansion of the time span including the current global crisis has been one 
of the basic motives of the present research effort. The aims of the paper briefly are: to analyze the convergence 
issue within EU-15 from 1995 to 2013; to find out the main factors of the convergence process in the EU-15 using 
panel data analysis; and finally, to examine if the impact of both corruption and bureaucracy on growth performance 
of the cohesion countries differs relative to the wealthier EU members. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly analyzes the theoretical basis of the growth 
determinants and their impact on growth. Section 3 describes the dataset and the model specifications. Section 4 
discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings and concludes.  
2. Literature review 
Following Sala-i-Martin (1996), there are two distinct types of convergence, absolute and conditional. Absolute 
convergence implies that countries approach a common steady state in terms of income, with the poor countries to 
grow faster than the richer ones. In this case, the growth rate of per capita GDP of an economy i, is given by Eq. (1), 
 
୧ǡ୲ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ  ݕ௜ǡ଴ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧ (1) 
  
where ܽ stands for the constant term, ߚ is the estimated rate of convergence and ߳௜ǡ௧ stands for the error term. The 
explanatory variable ݕ௜ǡ଴ is the initial GDP per capita of the country under consideration.  
The concept of conditional β-convergence implies that a country is converging to its own steady state level, 
based on cross section differences in physical and human capital, technology, population growth, etc. In this case the 
growth rate is given by Eq. (2),  
 
୧ǡ୲ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ  ݕ௜ǡ଴ ൅ ߛߕ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧ (2) 
 
where vector ߕ௜ǡ௧, includes several explanatory variables to account for conditional convergence. These variables, 
according to the theory, are the investment in physical and human capital, FDI, government consumption, inflation, 
trade openness, etc. However, a number of recent studies has been more skeptical about the robustness of the impact 
of these growth determinants and suggest that the statistical significance of their effect on growth depends on the 
specification of the empirical model, the period under consideration and the proxy variables for these factors.  
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Starting from Solow (1956) and moving forward to new growth theory, investment has an important role in 
growth process. Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) introduce externalities to capital whereby private returns to scale 
may be diminishing, but social returns - reflecting spillovers of knowledge or other externalities - can be constant or 
increasing. A positive relationship between growth and investment in physical capital has been found by Dowrick 
and Nguyen (1989),  Barro (1991), De Long and Summers (1991), Crafts (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro 
and Lee (1994), Mankiw et al. (1992),  Sachs and Warner (1995), Caseli et al. (1996), Cuaresma et al. (2008).  
Moreover, the effect of human capital on growth, according to a number of empirical studies, is found to be strong 
and positive. However, it is of major importance to study the channels through which human capital affects growth 
process. According to Barro (1997), for instance, the increase of human capital has a positive effect on labor 
productivity and, hence on growth. In this context, other studies support that the higher the human capital is the 
easier the technological adjustment is (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005; Acemoglou, 2003; Caselli and Coleman, 2006), 
while higher human capital affects positively institutions (Aghion et al., 1999). At an empirical level, this positive 
relation is confirmed by Becker (1962), Schultz (1971), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Barro (1991), Kyriacou 
(1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Bassanini et al. 
(2001),  Agiomirgianakis et al. (2002), Bloom et al. (2004), Cuaresma et al. (2008). However, the empirical results 
do not always follow the theoretical path and confirm a negative relation between human capital and growth, such as 
in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Bils and Klenow (2000), Easterly and Levine (2001), Pritchett (2001), Temple 
(2001), Bosworth and Collins (2003).  
Relationship between FDI and growth also seems to be ambiguous. The economic rationale for offering special 
incentives to attract FDI frequently derives from the belief that foreign investment produces externalities in the form 
of technology transfers and spillovers. FDI itself is the most important type of capital movement, stimulates 
additional investment in both human and physical capital, and increases competition in local markets. However, 
certain characteristics in the host countries, such as, the capacity to absorb new technologies (Borensztein at al., 
1998), or the existence of developed financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004) seem to play an important role. In 
contrast, some theories predict that FDI in the presence of pre-existing trade, price, financial, and other distortions 
will hurt resource allocation and slow down growth. Romer (1993), Li and Liu (2005) and Tiwari and Mutascu 
(2011) provide evidence of a positive association, Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), Brecher (1983) and Boyd 
and Smith (1999) find a negative effect, whereas UNCTAD (1999) and Ram and Zhang (2002) failed to find a clear 
linkage between FDI and growth.  
Inflation follows the same path, since the relationship between inflation and growth seems to be questionable. 
Feldestein (1997) argues that inflation can have a negative impact on growth through its negative direct effect on 
capital accumulation, while Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) point out that inflation may have a positive effect on 
growth through an increase of the cost of holding money, that is related to higher investment and growth. Although 
the debate about the precise relationship between these two variables is still open, it is generally accepted that 
inflation has a negative effect on medium and long-term growth. A negative relation between inflation and growth is 
found in the studies of Bassanini et al. (2001), Soukiazis and Castro (2005), Borys et al. (2008), Cuaresma et al. 
(2008). Contrary, Bruno (1995) found a positive association for an inflation rate below 30%.  
The same ambiguity surrounds the effect of government expenditures on growth. Following Karras (2001) 
government activities’ impact on growth depends mainly on their net productivity effect, while there may be also a 
“size” effect. More specifically, when government consumption is low, the productive effects of public spending 
may exceed the social costs of raising funds (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). On the contrary, high levels of 
government intervention may affect negatively growth through the reduction of the economic activity of the private 
sector (Yin et al., 2003). Furthermore, “distortionary” taxation required to finance government spending, poor 
investment policies and poor delivery of public services, such as public infrastructure have a negative effect on 
aggregate productivity and deteriorate the investment climate in which the private sector operates. However, in the 
context of endogenous growth theory, there is scope for well-designed government expenditure and tax systems to 
play an important role in reinforcing long-term growth, through its effects on the rates of investment in human and 
physical capital (Coutinho, 2012). Empirically, a negative effect has been confirmed by Barro (1991, 1997), Barro 
and Lee (1994), Sachs and Warner (1995), a positive in Caselli et al. (1996), while in Levine and Renelt (1992) and 
Bassanini et al. (2001) empirical evidence is not robust.  
As far as it concerns openness, the dominant growth theories support a positive relation to growth mentioning as 
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possible channels the exposure to competition and exploitation of comparative advantage as in Heckshel-Ohlin 
model, or the technology diffusion and knowledge spillovers as shown by the Ricardian model. Also, in the 
endogenous growth literature trade openness positively affects per capita income and growth through economies of 
scale and diffusion of knowledge between countries (Mirestean and Tsangarides, 2009). The growth-openness 
relation empirically is proved to be positive according to Frankel and Romer (1996), Frankel et al. (1996), Bassanini 
et al. (2001), while Kaitila (2004) and Rodriguez (2007) concluded that the more open economies did not fare better 
than the less open during the period 1990-2003.   
Apart from these basic variables, some others used in the relevant empirical literature are two institutional 
variables, namely corruption and bureaucracy. Existing literature indicates three channels through which corruption 
reduces economic growth; first, corruption prevents economic growth as it deteriorates the capacity of infrastructure 
through lower operation and maintenance expenditures, second, corruption decreases public investment and growth 
through lowering the productivity, third, corruption adversely effects tax revenue collection, which in turn lowers 
government revenues and thus growth. However, Leff (1964), Leys (1965) and Huntington (1968), suggest that 
corruption in the form of payment of bribes to bureaucrats acts like oil that greases and facilitates the engine of 
economic growth. Empirically, a negative association was found in Gould and Amero-Reyes (1983), United Nations 
(1990), Murphy et al. (1993), Meon and Sekkat (2005), Mauro (1995, 1998), LaPorta et al. (1999), Mo (2001), 
Monte and Papagni (2001). On the contrary, Summers (1977), Lui (1985), Lui (1996), Acemoglou and Verdier 
(1998) provide evidence of a positive effect of corruption on growth.   
Similarly, bureaucracy-growth association appears to be ambiguous at a theoretical as well as at the empirical 
level. For instance, Weber in his monumental work Economy and Society postulates that bureaucracy consists a 
basic tool of capitalist growth, opposing to the “Smithian” view according to which government, regardless of its 
organizational form, is the enemy of growth. Rauch (1995) points out that in the context of “Weberian” view the 
impact of bureaucracy on economic growth is twofold. A positive effect emanates from the benefits of 
complementary inputs such as infrastructure development, while a negative one comes from taxation over returns of 
private investment. Rauch (1995) and Evans and Rauch (1999) confirm the existence of a positive relationship 
between bureaucracy and growth, while a negative association is detected in Colclough and Manor (1991), Ayal and 
Karras (1996), and Chowdhury (2006).  
3. Data and methodology  
This research effort used the older fifteen EU members excluding Luxembourg as an outlier country, namely 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. These countries were then separated into two distinct groups, the four cohesion countries (EU-4, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the remaining ten members (EU-10). The data are annual covering the 
period 1995-2013 and they were found in various databases such as the World Bank, International Transparency 
database, Heritage Foundation and Penn World Table.  
This research effort used the system-GMM developed by Arellano and Bover, (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), in order to avoid the endogeneity problem that Ordinary Least Squares regressions brought out. The GMM 
methodology is known as one of the best methods in panel analysis (Caselli et al., 1996; and Borys et al. 2008) since 
it uses a great number of instrumental variables (previous observations of the explanatory and the lagged dependent 
variable). Panel analysis is also preferred because it gives more variability, reduces the chances of collinearity 
among variables, it is suited to study the dynamics of change and enables studying more complicated models 
(Baltagi, 1995). This methodology can additionally capture the influence of certain periods of time on the economic 
growth, e.g. economic recessions and/or financial crisis, by including dummy variables in the panel regression. To 
assess the validity of the three specifications, we compute the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first- and second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals.  
Concerning the model, the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP (in Purchasing Power 
Parity, in constant prices of 2011). Taking into account the notion of conditional convergence, it is necessary to 
examine the effect of basic macroeconomic variables used as explanatory ones. These are domestic investment and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), both, as percentage of GDP, as well as human capital (index of human capital per 
person, based on years of schooling according to Barro-Lee, 2012). In addition, inflation (annual rate of change) and 
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government consumption as percentage of GDP are selected in order to capture the impact of macroeconomic 
stabilization and are expected to have a negative effect on growth. On the contrary, trade openness which is defined 
as exports plus imports divided by GDP, is expected to affect growth positively. Moreover, the institutional impact 
is captured by means of the variables corruption and bureaucracy. For corruption, the Corruption Perception Index, 
derived from Transparency International, is measured on a scale of 0-10, where 0 means that a country is perceived 
as highly corrupt and 10 means it is perceived as very clean. This index has been rescaled (i.e. adjusted index=10-
original index) so that an increase in the index can be directly interpreted as an increase in the level of corruption. 
As for bureaucracy, the variable used is constructed in line with Papaconstantinou et al. (2013) as BUR=1-economic 
freedom index. The economic freedom expresses the quality of bureaucracy of a country and the relevant index 
derived from the Heritage Foundation. The higher the index is the higher level of government interference exists. 
Additionally, to differentiate the two groups of countries mentioned earlier, we included the dummy DUM4 which 
takes the value 1 for the EU-4 countries and value 0 for the rest of them. Finally, two interaction terms are 
constructed to capture possible differences in the response of growth to corruption and bureaucracy: COR4, defined 
as COR*DUM4, and BUR4, defined as BUR*DUM4.  
4. Results  
Table 1 presents the results of alternative specifications aiming at the detection of the most important long-term 
determinants of growth. A general specification of the estimated model with all the explored possible determinants 
is given below: 
 
୧ǡ୲ ൌ ሺ୧ǡ୲ିଵǡ ୧ǡ୲ǡ 	୧ǡ୲ǡ ୧ǡ୲ǡ 	୧ǡ୲ǡ 
୧ǡ୲ǡ ୧ǡ୲ǡ ୧ǡ୲ǡ ୧ǡ୲ǡ Ͷ୧ǡ୲ǡ Ͷ୧ǡ୲ሻ  
 
where ୧ǡ୲ stands for the annual growth rate of real per capita GDP in country i, ୧ǡ୲ିଵ or the (log) lagged per capita 
GDP is the core explanatory variable. A significantly negative sign of its coefficient provides evidence of 
conditional convergence.  and 	 stand for domestic and Foreign Direct Investment respectively,  stands for 
human capital, 	 for inflation rate,
 for government consumption,  is the trade openness of the 
economy, and  and  is the corruption and bureaucracy index respectively, while the last two parameters are 
the interaction terms of the two institutional variables.  
According to the results, the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected at any significance level. 
Furthermore, the Sargan test accept the validity of instruments and the AR(1) test of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
indicates that the residuals are first order autocorrelated. Additionally, the AR(2) test for the absence of second order 
autocorrelation of the differenced residuals supports that we cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation at any 
conventional significance level. This fact is important because the consistency of the GMM estimator hinges on this 
property.   
In columns 1-4 the short term coefficients are presented.1 In the first model (A), apart from the lagged dependent 
variable and the lagged per capita GDP, a number of economic factors such as investment in physical and human 
capital, FDI, inflation, government consumption and trade openness are included. The negative and significant 
coefficient of ୧ǡ୲ିଵ provides evidence of conditional convergence. With the exception of FDI and human capital 
which have an insignificant coefficient, all the other variables enter the model with the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. More specifically, investment in physical capital and trade openness, have a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level, appearing as robust driving forces of growth. In contrast, inflation and 
government consumption, as it was expected, have a negative and significant coefficient indicating a growth-
hampering effect.  
 
 
1 Within the dynamic framework of Equation (2), E must be thought of as short-run coefficients, measuring the immediate (within the year) 
response of growth rate to temporary shocks in & ,i t . Long-run coefficients are identified as γଵିఉ  and they measure the total adjustment of the 
growth rate following sustained shocks in & ,i t . 
60   X. Chapsa et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  33 ( 2015 )  55 – 63 
In the model (B) corruption, as it is indicated by COR and COR4 is added to the model. With the exception of 
HC which turns to be significant, the sign as well the significance of the coefficients of the other variables remains 
unchanged. Corruption seems to have a negative and significant effect on growth, both, in the full sample and the 
cohesion countries group. This result appears supporting the hypothesis that, a country that improves its standing on 
corruption will experience an increase in its GDP growth rate. A fact of particular interest is that the FDI, possibly 
due to its correlation with investment which is treated as endogenous in our model, seems to exercise a non 
significant negative effect on growth in all specifications.  
In the next model (C), adding the BUR and BUR4 variables to the model, leaves unchanged the sign and the 
significance of the other factors. As it concerns the effect of bureaucracy, the positive and significant coefficient in 
the full sample gives support to the “Weberian” view according to which a positive effect on growth possibly is due 
to the benefits of complementary inputs like the development of infrastructures. Contrary, the negative and 
significant coefficient in the cohesion countries comes in accordance to the “Smithian” view and means that 
bureaucracy affects growth in this group of countries differently than in the full sample. More specifically, an 
increase of bureaucracy by one unit in the cohesion countries, has a negative net effect on growth equal to -0,0005. 
Finally, in the full model (D), where COR, COR4, BUR and BUR4 are entered all together in the model, the signs of 
economic variables as well as the corruption variables remain unchanged. Moreover, bureaucracy has no significant 
effect on growth in the whole sample, while the negative and significant coefficient of BUR4 implies that 
bureaucracy affects growth in this group of countries rather differently than in the entire group, hampering growth.   
Respectively, columns 5 to 8 present the long term effects. All the coefficients of the economic variables enter 
the models with the same sign and significance with the short run estimates but with a fairly higher value. However, 
bureaucracy in the whole sample does not affect growth since the results do not support any statistical significance. 
Contrary, in the cohesion countries less bureaucracy stimulates growth. More specifically, a unit decrease of the 
bureaucracy drives growth upwards by 0.0012 units. Finally, in the full model (H), where COR, COR4, BUR and 
BUR4 are entered all together in the model, corruption has no significant impact on growth in the cohesion 
countries, while the negative and significant coefficient of BUR4 implies that bureaucracy affects growth in this 
group of countries rather differently than in the entire group, hampering growth.  
 
Table 1. Conditional convergence in the EU-15 (1995-2013), System – GMM. Dependent Variable: growth rate 
 
  Short Run Coefficients  Long Run Coefficients 
A 
(1) 
B 
(2) 
C 
(3) 
D 
(4) 
E 
(5) 
F 
(6) 
G 
(7) 
H 
(8) 
growth(-1) 0.3365b 0.2194c 0.2515b 0.2352c     
ܔܖܡܑܜି૚ -0.0858a -0.1282a -0.1525a -0.1419a -0.1293a -0.1642a -0.2037a -.1855a 
INV 0.1415b 0.2189c 0.2749a 0.2457a 0.2132b 0.2805a 0.3673a 0.3212a 
FDI -0.0177 -0.0205 -0.0268 -0.0262 -0.0266 -0.0263 -0.0359 -0.0342 
HC 0.0190 0.0304a 0.0332a -0.0264a 0.0287 0.039a 0.0443a 0.0345a 
INFL(-1) -1.0962a -0.9336a -0.9635a -0.9448a -1.6522a -1.196a -1.2871a -1.2353a 
GOVEXP -0.2383a -0.3166a -0.2793a -0.3518a -0.3592a -0.4056a -0.3732a -0.456a 
OPEN 0.0222b 0.0252a 0.2861a 0.0303a 0.0335a 0.0323a 0.0382a 0.0396a 
COR  -0.0002b  -0.0003c  -0.0003b  -0.0004b 
COR4  -0.0005a  -0.0005c  -0.0006a  0.0006 
BUR   0.0004c 0.0001   -0.0005 0.0002 
BUR4   -0.0009a -0.0013a   -0.0012a -0.0017a 
Obs.  224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 
AR(1) 0.028 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.028 0.009 0.008 0.013 
AR(2) 0.340 0.274 0.222 0.270 0.340 0.274 0.222 0.270 
Sargan test 0.677 0.521 0.369 0.263 0.677 0.521 0.369 0.263 
Note: a, b and c denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level respectively. 
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as a X2 under the null of instruments validity.  
AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first- and second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals, which are 
asymptotically distributed as a N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we examined the existence of conditional convergence in the EU-14 focusing on the growth 
performance of the four cohesion countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. More specifically, we 
investigated the effect of a core set of explanatory economic variables widely used in the growth literature, along 
with corruption and bureaucracy to account for possible institutional effects. In order to achieve this, we constructed 
two group-specific interaction variables to capture possible different responses of growth between the four cohesion 
countries and the remaining members of the EU-14. 
The findings provided evidence of conditional convergence in the EU-14. Concerning investment in physical and 
human capital, we found that both types of investment influence positively the growth. Openness also appeared to 
be a robust driving force of growth in line with the neoclassical as well as the endogenous growth models that assert 
the gains of trade liberalization on growth through comparative advantages, technology transfer, diffusion of 
knowledge and economies of scale. Only FDI does not appear to exercise a significant effect on growth. Finally, in 
the full model (C), we concluded that in the whole sample as well as in the cohesion countries, less corruption 
promotes growth. Contrary, bureaucracy affects growth in the cohesion countries rather differently than in the entire 
group, hampering growth. As it concerns long-run estimates, the sign as well as the significance of the economic 
variables remain unchanged. Despite the fact that less corruption seems to promote growth in the whole sample, 
bureaucracy appears to hamper growth only in case of the cohesion countries.  
Taking all the above into consideration, it seems that government could influence investment either directly or 
indirectly through incentives to the private sector, ensuring property rights, promoting competition and efficiency in 
product and factor markets. Also, the governmental orientation should be to the "out-oriented" trade strategies (Ahn 
and Hemmings, 2000). Additionally, national macroeconomic policies should ensure macroeconomic stability by 
minimizing any relative price distortions in the domestic market, setting the optimal mix of taxes, enhancing the 
credibility of monetary policy, etc (De Gregorio, 1996; Ahn and Hemmings, 2000). As it concerns corruption, our 
results imply that reducing corruption would be more profitable for all countries. Encouraging countries to control 
corruption, while also trying to improve bureaucratic quality, is a real prudent policy recommendation -especially 
for the cohesion countries.  
Finally, a formal and in depth analysis of the channels through which corruption affects growth is required in the 
future. Thus, our analysis should be carried out again in the future to take advantage of the improvements in the 
measures of corruption and bureaucracy and of the availability of longer time series. 
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